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We analyze the puzzling behavior of the volatility of individual stock returns over the 
past few decades. The literature has provided many different explanations to the trend in 
volatility and this paper tests the viability of the different explanations. Virtually all 
current theoretical arguments that are provided for the trend in the average level of 
volatility over time lend themselves to explanations about the difference in volatility 
levels between firms in the cross-section. We therefore focus separately on the cross-
sectional and time-series explanatory power of the different proxies. We fail to find a 
proxy that is able to explain both dimensions well. In particular, we find that Cao et al. 
(2008) market-to-book ratio tracks average volatility levels well, but has no cross-
sectional explanatory power. On the other hand, the low-price proxy suggested by Brandt 
et al. (2010) has much cross-sectional explanatory power, but has virtually no time-series 
explanatory power. We also find that the different proxies do not explain the trend in 
volatility in the period prior to 1995 (R-squared of virtually zero), but explain rather well 
the trend in volatility at the turn of the Millennium (1995-2005). 
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1. Introduction 
Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu (2001) and Xu and Malkiel (2003) 
demonstrated that firm-level volatility exhibited an upward trend between the early 1960s 
and the late 1990s. This observation led to a flurry of corporate finance research that has 
attempted to rationalize this trend. The overall conclusion from this subsequent research 
is that the change in volatility is explained by the increased importance of Nasdaq firms 
and risky industries (Schwert, 2002; Bennett and Sias, 2006); the increased ownership of 
institutions (Xu and Malkiel, 2003); the younger listing age of a firm (Fink et al., 2006); 
the increased cash flow risk of newly listed firms (Brown and Kapadia, 2006); the 
increased uncertainty in profitability (Wei and Zhang, 2006; Pastor and Veronesi, 2006); 
the increased product market competition (Irvine and Pontiff, 2009); the increased level 
and variance of firm growth options (Hollifield, 2002, Cao et al., 2008); and the low 
stock price of many firms during speculative market episodes such as the one witnessed 
in the late 1990s (Brandt et al., 2010).  
To understand the scope of the previous literature we list the variables used in 
these studies in Table 1. Despite there being many competing explanations proposed in 
the literature there has been little systematic effort to reconcile the various explanations. 
Noting that these various explanations are related (e.g., younger firms tend to trade on 
Nasdaq, have high growth options, have lower prices, do not pay dividends, and have 
high volatility in cash flows) and given that most of these explanations seem to relate to 
structural changes in the financial markets in the 90’s (with the emergence and growth of 
the technology sector), it seems natural to ask two questions: How “different” the 
different competing explanations actually are, and do these explanations track the trend in   3
volatility prior to the structural change in the mid 90’s.  
In this paper we analyze the viability of the different explanations proposed in the 
literature for the time-trend in average volatility level. We adopt an expansive analysis 
focusing on many variables using both time-series and cross-sectional analysis. We find 
that many of the variables considered work well in one context but fail dismally in the 
other. We also find that the relationship between volatility and the different proxies 
exhibits a structural break around 1995. Since variables are able to explain the behavior 
of volatility during some sub-periods but not others we clearly do not have a robust 
theoretical picture of what drives volatility.  
In Figure 1 we plot the market value-weighted averages of quarterly volatility, 
quarterly excess industry volatility, and quarterly sum of squared errors from a daily 
return regression estimation that includes the three-factor Fama and French (1993) model 
including the Carhart (1997) momentum factor (hence, four-factor model).  The 
calculation is based on daily returns in the same way that was done by Campbell et al. 
(2001) for the first two measures, and based on quarterly regressions of daily returns 
residuals for the four-factor model. As shown in the Figure 1, the trend in total volatility, 
the trend in idiosyncratic volatility based on the Campbell et al. (2001) decomposition, 
and the trend in idiosyncratic volatility based on the four-factor model, are virtually the 
same. We show that past studies could have easily done their analyses on total volatility, 
and the much attention given in past studies to different types of volatility decomposition 
is redundant.
2 Also apparent from the figure is that the trend Campbell et al. (2001) 
                                                 
2 Note from Table 1 that different studies measure idiosyncratic risk differently. We find that the 
differences between different volatility variables are unimportant both for time-series and cross-sectional 
analyses. Arguably, it is somewhat misleading to refer to these studies as studies of idiosyncratic volatility, 
as that suggests that total volatility analyses would yield different results.    4
observed in the sample ending in 1997 is clearly a temporary “hump” in volatility at the 
turn of the Millennium, a point also observed by Brandt et al. (2010). Volatility since the 
start of 2004 seems to accord with historical norms. There appear to be three main 
episodes of abnormally high volatility: the 1974 OPEC oil crisis, an outlier in the fourth 
quarter of 1987 associated with the crash in October, and the aberrant behavior in 
volatility associated with the tech-bubble. The first two episodes and the “hump” at the 
end of the Millennium differ both in the length of the episode and magnitude of volatility 
elevation. Because the “hump” lasted for about a decade and the variation in volatility 
during this decade was particularly acute it seems clear that the significance of a 
particular proxy would predominantly depend on its ability to explain volatility behavior 
during this “hump” period. Further, it is not clear why the different explanations provided 
in the literature (age of a firm, growth options, etc.) would be an important characteristic 
for systematic events such as the 1974 OPEC oil crises, and the 1987 crash. We thus pay 
particular attention to the run-up and subsequent drop in volatility around this episode in 
our empirical analysis.
3  
We undertake an empirical study of volatility using both cross-sectional and time-
series tests using weighted-average predictor variables.
4 Our point is simple; most of the 
papers of Table 1 claim to provide an explanation for the volatility trend in the market. 
However, most of the papers listed in Table 1 only provide cross-sectional evidence that 
their chosen proxy is correlated with volatility. The common reason for not directly 
testing correlation between the trend in volatility and the trend in the proxy associated 
                                                 
3 We note that understanding volatility changes by analyzing the period in which it changed the most was 
also the approach taken by Schwert (2002).  
4 We use the term cross-section somewhat loosely. We refer to our panel data firm-level analysis, which 
pools both time-series and cross-sectional data, a cross-sectional analysis to distinguish it from our pure 
time-series analysis that uses only the time series of cross-sectional value-weighted variables.    5
with the explanation is that it is difficult, if not impossible, to directly prove or disprove a 
theory based on a single trended series (see for example, Brandt et al. (2010) Section 
4.1). However we claim differently; without a direct test that relates the chosen proxy to 
the trend in volatility, the relevance of the explanation to the overall trend in volatility 
remains unclear. If the explanation is to have “a first-order effect” on the trend in average 
volatility levels, it should be correlated with it. Notably, there are studies that focus 
predominantly on analyzing the trend. For example, Cao et al. (2008) present strong 
evidence that the average market-to-book ratio is correlated with the trend in volatility. 
Unfortunately, these authors do not provide any analysis on the relevance of the market 
to book ratio for explaining cross-sectional variation in volatility levels across firms. 
To motivate the joint focus on the time-series and panel suppose that a particular 
firm characteristic is positively related to firm-level volatility. A systematic increase in 
that characteristic or an increase in the market capitalization of firms with high values of 
that characteristic will result in higher average volatility. For example, if low priced firms 
tend to be more volatile because of retail investors trading of these stocks, then a 
systematic decrease in share prices will mean that the relative importance of low priced 
shares in the market has increased, and that should lead to an increase in the average 
volatility in the market. Thus, a systematic change in share price levels should be 
correlated with the trend in volatility. It will also mean that a share’s price will have 
cross-sectional explanatory power when comparing volatility levels across firms. 
Virtually all current theoretical arguments that are provided for the studies in Table 1 
lend themselves to explanations about the difference in volatility levels between firms 
just as well as they do for a time-series explanation for the trend in the average level of   6
volatility in the market. Thus, by looking at these two dimensions jointly we provide a 
deeper analysis of the usefulness of the different explanations and their proxies. 
Obviously we need both these features for a plausible explanation for the behavior of 
volatility: the variable must explain volatility across different firms and the variable must 
also have changed through time. A variable that explains much in the cross-section but 
has not changed through time is of limited usefulness. Only a time-series analysis based 
on value-weighted averages of the variable and volatility can identify variation through 
time. On the other hand by focusing exclusively on the time-series evidence we lose a 
tremendous amount of useful information because we have relatively few observations 
(slightly over 125 quarterly observations as opposed to tens of thousands of firm-
quarters), and the time-series variables exhibit a high degree of correlation. Although 
some previous research has focused exclusively on either the cross-section (Xu and 
Malikiel, 2003; Pastor and Versonesi, 2003; Bennett and Sias, 2006; Brandt et al., 2010) 
or the time series (Cao et al., 2008), there are studies that consider both types of analyses 
(Wei and Zhang, 2006; Fink et al., 2006; Rajgopal and Venkatachalam, 2010; Brown and 
Kapadia, 2007; Irvine and Pontiff, 2009). However, those studies that do include time-
series regressions only include few variables.
5  
The studies of Table 1 use different sample sizes and different volatility (or 
idiosyncratic volatility) measures. This raises the question of whether it is possible to 
conduct a fair horse race between the different proxies. To resolve this issue, we start our 
study by conducting an in-depth analysis of the different measures and samples and show 
that differences in these aspects between studies are small, insignificant, and do not affect 
                                                 
5 Rajgopal and Venkatachalam (2010) is the only paper to conduct a multivariate time-series with more 
than three variables (in their Table 4). However, the variables included in their analysis (except for market-
to-book) are not those variables that are associated with the other explanations provided in the literature.    7
our results. Further, we show that the importance of the different proxies for the trend are 
similar whether we include lagged volatility in the regression or not, suggesting that the 
results of this study are robust. 
Our main empirical results can be summarized as follows: 
1)  Cross section – turnover and low price are the most robust variables in the cross-
section (except for lag volatility). Other variables that have cross sectional 
explanatory power include: a firm’s age, dividend dummy, volatility in 
fundamentals, and Nasdaq classification. Important, the market-to-book ratio has 
no cross-sectional explanatory power which questions the relevance of the 
managerial growth-options explanation (Cao et al., 2008).  
2)  Time series - Many of the variables proposed in past studies fail to provide any 
contribution to the trend. These variables are associated with the following 
explanations: speculative episodes associated with low priced stocks (Brandt et 
al., 2010), institutional ownership (Malkiel and Xu, 2003), and volatility in 
fundamentals (Wei and Zhang, 2006; Irvine and Pontiff, 2009). Interestingly, the 
market-to-book ratio is the single strongest variable in the time-series regressions 
(other than lagged volatility).  
3)  Overall conclusion - The variables that have cross-sectional explanatory power 
and also track average volatility over time (once lagged volatility is included) are 
Nasdaq classification (Schwertz, 2002); the age of the firm (Fink et al., 2006; 
Brown and Kapadia, 2007); dividend policy (Pastor and Veronesi, 2003); and 
turnover. A univariate time-series regression with any of these variables and 
lagged volatility yields somewhat similar results with an adjusted R-squared in   8
the range 0.41-0.47.  However, these variables are not able to explain the trend in 
the average volatility level in the pre-1995 period. Thus, it seems that the 
explanations are not able to describe the trend over the three decades, but rather 
these variables do a particularly good job in tracking the average level of 
volatility level during the “hump” period.  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section II provides an empirical analysis 
on the differences between different volatility measures. In Section III we describe our 
data and the proxies that we use to compare past studies. Section IV presents our cross-
sectional panel regression results and Section V the time-series results. We conclude in 
Section VI.  
 
2. Volatility 
2.1. Different volatility measures 
As can be seen from Table 1, past studies addressing the volatility trend used a 
variety of volatility measures. Some studies analyzed total volatility (Schwert, 2002; Wei 
and Zhang, 2006), some analyzed the market model residual (Pastor and Veronesi, 2003), 
some analyzed the residual of a four-factor model (Xu and Malkiel, 2003; Brown and 
Kapadia, 2007), some analyzed the Campbell et al. (2001) market adjusted volatility 
measure (Wei and Zhang, 2007; Irvine and Pontiff, 2009), and some analyzed the 
industry adjusted Campbell et al. (2001) measure (Brandt et al., 2010; Bennett and Sias, 
2006; Fink et al., 2006; Cao et. al, 2008). Most of the studies claim that their results are 
robust to other volatility specifications and usually provide a short discussion of why they 
used their particular measure. However, none of the studies engage in an empirical   9
analysis to assess the difference between the different volatility measures. This is 
important because if there is no real difference between the different measures, then it is 
not clear why we should go through the process of developing these measures in the first 
place instead of simply analyzing total volatility levels as done in Schwert (2002). 
We note that although Campbell et al. (2001) find an upward trend in average 
idiosyncratic volatility they do not uncover such a trend in the volatility of aggregate 
stock market returns, which suggests that the trend in idiosyncratic volatility should 
closely track the trend in total volatility. Indeed, as can be seen from Figure 1, the pattern 
of the volatility measure, the excess industry volatility measure, and the sum of squared 
errors of the four-factor model are similar. The difference between the different measures 
is in their magnitude: volatility is higher than excess industry volatility; and the excess 
industry volatility is higher than the sum of squared errors of the four-factor model. This 
is rather intuitive because the four-factor model allows for time-varying betas. An 
important observation is the outlier in the 4
th quarter of 1987. Because the one day event 
on October 1987 was market-wide, the Campbell et al. (2001) excess industry volatility 
measure is smaller than the sum of squared errors of the four-factor model. This is 
because the-four factor model estimation is done quarterly based on daily returns, so the 
market-wide drop in prices on a single day only marginally contributes to the beta 
calculations of the model; however, as in the Campbell et al. (2001) methodology the 
residuals are calculated daily, the excess industry volatility is relatively small if there is a 
one day market-wide drop in prices. Thus, it is important to note that the correlation 
between the different measures is affected by this outlier – as this one day event changes 
the relative magnitude ordering between the three measures.    10
 
2.2. Sample size and correlations 
In this study we employ a large set of conditioning variables to study the volatility 
trend during the years 1972-2005. A limitation of using many conditioning variables is 
that the sample size is reduced because some firms do not have the necessary data to 
compute the conditional variables (namely data from either Compustat or Thomson 
Financial). As we want to address the trend in the population (all NYSE-AMEX-Nasdaq 
traded firms), we must mitigate concerns that the results of this paper are sample 
specific.
6  
Table 2 provides cross-section and time-series correlations of four different 
measures of volatility across our sample (246,607 firm-quarter observations) and across 
the population (814,542 firm-quarter observations). In Panel A below the diagonal, we 
provide the cross-section correlation and rank Spearman correlation between pair-wise 
volatility measures in a given quarter. The standard deviation of the correlation across the 
quarters is provided in parenthesis. Above the diagonal, the population pair-wise cross-
section correlations are provided. There are two major things to take from Panel A. First, 
all measures are highly correlated. In particular in our sample, volatility has a correlation 
of above 67% with the three idiosyncratic volatility measures. This is an extremely high 
correlation for such a large sample, and it broadly suggests that cross-sectional regression 
results with any one of these measures should be rather similar. The correlations between 
                                                 
6 In general, we believe that differences in samples across the studies of Table 1 are of minimal concern. In 
broad terms, it is fair to say that most of the studies in Table 1 and our study include at least 70% of the 
market value of firms during those three decades. However, to make sure that this is indeed the case, we 
replicate Cao et al. (2008) with the full sample of firms (their original work does not include the financial 
services sector as these firms are theoretically less linked to growth options) and find that their results are 
robust for the full sample of firms. The only two studies which rely on a much smaller sample size are Xu 
and Malkiel (2003) and Rajgopal and Venkatachalam (2010). We believe that samples of these latter two 
studies are not necessarily representative of the overall US market.    11
the measures in the population are even higher. Second, the lowest pair-wise correlation 
is between the excess industry measure and the four-factor measure, with a correlation of 
0.42 in our sample (0.67 in the population). Though even this correlation is rather high 
for such a large sample, it is interesting that the correlation between two different kind of 
idiosyncratic measures is lower than the correlations between the total volatility measure 
and the different idiosyncratic measures.  
In Panel B, we provide average measures across the sample period. Thus, since 
we have 128 quarters, each measure is based on 128 observations. These are purely time-
series correlations as there is one observation per quarter. Given that we know that 
1987q4 is an outlier, in parenthesis we provide correlation across 127 quarters, excluding 
this quarter. Below the diagonal we provide value-weighted measures, while above the 
diagonal we provide equal-weighted measures. We observe two things. First, value-
weighted measures are highly correlated. In particular, the correlations between the 
volatility-sample measure and all the other volatility measures are above 0.92. Further, 
the correlations uniformly increase once we exclude 1987q4 (the correlation between 
excess industry and four-factors increase from 0.83 to 0.92).  These correlations do not 
seem to vary depending on the sample size. Second, equal-weighted measures have a 
relatively low correlation. Also, for equal-weighted measures the sample size matters. 
Take for example the correlation between excess market and excess industry. In our 
sample, the correlation is 0.999, however; in the population it drops to 0.66. Even if we 
take the correlation between the same measure across the sample and population, the 
correlation is not high given the small number of observations (for example, for the 
excess market measure the correlation is 0.80). This suggests that results concerning   12
equal-weighted measures will depend on the type of dependent variable we employ. 
Obviously, when the correlation between measures is not very high and the sample is 
small, the results cannot be robust and we therefore do not analyze equal-weighted 
measures in this paper. To conserve space we only report our total volatility analysis, but 
the results using the other three idiosyncratic volatility measures are qualitatively similar 
and are available on request. We find that the ranking of the three or four most important 
conditioning variables (in terms of statistical significance) in both the cross-sectional and 
time-series analyses is the same across the different measures.
7 
 
3. Conditioning variables 
Because we are primarily interested in explaining the last decade of unusual 
volatility we select a wide range of potential explanatory variables. Because some 
relevant variables are only available for a short time period we face a trade-off between 
having a very long sample with fewer variables or many variables over a shorter sample. 
To suitably balance these two concerns we use only data from Compustat, CRSP and 
Thomson Financial. As some of the explanations provided in the literature are highly 
overlapping (in the empirical sense), our guideline for selecting between alternative 
variables is to choose the variable that covers the largest number of firms. For example, 
we include volatility in profitability measures (Wei and Zhang, 2006) rather than cash 
flow volatility measures (Irvine and Pontiff, 2009) because it has fewer missing 
observations. We also omit variables that are based on very limited data sets (e.g., 
I/B/E/S or Zacks data set). To construct a volatility in profitability measure (Wei and 
                                                 
7 We do note that there are some interesting differences beyond this. For example, the cross sectional 
regressions on volatility and excess industry volatility yield higher R-squared than those of the 
idiosyncratic volatility from a four-factor model.   13
Zhang, 2006), we require financial information for the previous 12 quarters. As 
Compustat provides quarterly information starting 1970, our data includes all NYSE, 
AMEX and Nasdaq firms for which we have no missing values during the period 1973q1 
to 2005q1. In total, we have 246,607 firm-quarter observations. 
 
3.1. Nasdaq 
  Schwert (2002) documents that Nasdaq firms have shown a dramatic increase in 
volatility during the mid-late 90s. We therefore employ a Nasdaq indicator, which equals 
1 if the firm is traded on Nasdaq, and zero otherwise.  
 
3.2. Dividends 
  Pastor and Veronesi (2003) and Rubin and Smith (2009) show that firms that do 
not pay dividends have much more volatile returns. In fact, both studies show that 
dividend policy is the most significant determinant of volatility in the cross-section. We 
follow these studies and employ a No dividend indicator, which equals 1 if the firm did 
not pay a dividend during the quarter. 
  
3.3. Age 
  Fink et al. (2006) argue that there has been a substantial increase in the fraction of 
young firms contemporaneously with the increase in idiosyncratic volatility. They focus 
primarily on the average age of a firm at the time of its IPO. They argue that in recent 
decades, and especially in the late 1990s, younger firms became public and coupled with 
the significant increase in the number of firms going public, it lead to a steady increase in   14
idiosyncratic risk. Theoretically, the idea of age affecting volatility is supported by Pastor 
and Veronesi (2003) who claim that investors learn about firm’s profitability over time. 
In a different study, Brown and Kapadia (2007) claim that it is not age itself that is 
important for volatility, but rather, firms that have been listed in more recent years are 
fundamentally riskier.
8 It is important in their analysis that firms from more recent IPO 
vintages exhibit persistently higher idiosyncratic risk than firms from earlier vintages. 
They claim that if firm age itself is important for volatility we should have observed a 
reduction in a firm’s volatility over time, as it ages.  However, they do not find evidence 
of a meaningful or consistent decline in volatility for IPO listing vintage groups over 
time. An alternative explanation for this empirical observation is that the marginal 
contribution of a single year to the age of a firm is important only in the first few years 
post-IPO, when the investing public is not familiar with the company. Because Brown 
and Kapadia (2007) partition firms to 10 year segments based on IPO vintage, they may 
miss the resolution of the age variable where it matters most, i.e. when firms are very 
young. Further, as we observe in Figure 1, most of the variation in volatility occurs 
during the years 1995-2004. During that period the number of new listed firms increased 
(and then decreased) dramatically so both the average firm age and the value of the 1995-
2004 IPO vintage will be highly correlated. To include the finding of both papers, our 
Age variable is the number of years since the firm appears on CRSP and we Winsorize 
our age variable at 30 years, as the marginal effect of a year for older firms is limited.
9 
                                                 
8 Empirically, Brown and Kapadia (2007) show that 5 dummy variables of IPO vintage decades drive out 
age in the cross-section. 
9 Note that Fink et al. (2006) and Brown and Kapdia (2007) measure age as the year of either founding or 
incorporation, while Pastor and Veronesi (2003) measure age as the number of years since the firm appears 
on CRSP. We find that the two measures are highly correlated (0.89), and that the way age is measured 
does not alter the results.   15
 
3.4. Earnings and earnings volatility 
  Wei and Zhang (2006) claim that changes in earnings fundamentals may be the 
reason behind the increase in idiosyncratic volatility, which Irvine and Pontiff (2009) 
claim is attributed to more intense economy-wide competition. Both papers produce 
somewhat different proxies for volatility in fundamental cash flow; however, they both 
rely on data from the 12 previous quarters. Because Wei and Zhang’s (2006) measure has 
fewer missing observations we follow their methodology. They show that stock return 
volatility is negatively related to the return on equity (ROE) and positively related to the 
volatility of profitability (VOLP). We follow Wei and Zhang (2006) in calculating 
VOLP based on the previous 12 quarters ROEs, and Winsorize the firm-level ROE 
observation at -0.5 and 0.5. 
 
3.5. Share price 
  Brandt et al. (2010) find a strong cross-sectional relation between low priced 
stock and idiosyncratic volatility. They suggest that volatility tends to elevate during 
episodes of euphoric bull markets with record price-fundamental multiples. They suggest 
that during these speculative episodes investors are particularly attracted to low priced 
stocks, which leads to a strong correlation between share price and return volatility. We 
thus use a Low price indicator for firms whose price is less than $10 at the end of the 
quarter.  
   16
3.6. Growth options 
Cao et al. (2008) establish a theoretical link between idiosyncratic risk and growth 
options available to managers. While they motivate their analysis by manager’s desire to 
increase the value of the equity by taking more idiosyncratic risk when these options are 
available; empirically, it would be hard to distinguish between a managerial growth 
option explanation and a simple change in long term growth (Xu and Malkiel, 2003). To 
illustrate this point, consider the market-to-book ratio, which is Cao et al.’s (2008) 
preferred proxy for managerial growth options. According to the Gordon growth model, 
the value of a share is given by 
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where d0 is the current dividend, re  is the required return on equity and g the expected 
growth rate of the firm’s dividends. Since dividends paid can be represented as the return 
on equity multiplied by the payout ratio, the market-to-book ratio can be represented as 
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where B0 is the book value of equity, and ROE is net income divided by equity. Even if 
we assume a fixed re (i.e., as we are focusing our attention on idiosyncratic volatility), we 
must be cautious in interpreting what market-to-book is proxying for, as it is a 
combination of dividend policy (payout ratio), profitability (ROE), and expectations on 
growth (or alternatively availability of growth options). Unfortunately the link between 
the theoretical motivation (i.e., managerial growth options) and the empirical support 
becomes unclear when market-to-book is used to track changes in volatility levels. 
Further, as capital expenditure, an alternative proxy used by Cao et al. (2008) for growth   17
options, does not track volatility well, it is hard to interpret these results.
10 In our analysis 
we use the market-to-book measure (Maba) and calculate it following Appendix B of 
Cao et al. (2008).   
 
3.7. Regulated industries 
  One possible explanation for the change in volatility may be changes in the 
composition of industries, which is referred to in Bennett and Sias (2006) and Wang 
(2010). While to some extent this change is captured by Nasdaq, we also employ a Not 
regulated indicator for firms that are classified in non-regulated industries (first SIC digit 
is not 4 or 6). We choose this variable because regulated firms are significantly less 
volatile than non-regulated firms. 
 
3.8. Institutional ownership 
  Another possible explanation for the change in volatility may be the increase in 
the level of institutional ownership that has occurred in the last decade. Xu and Malkiel 
(2003) claim that institutions may have common sentiments and their interpretation of 
news may lead to similar buy/sell decisions. If that is the case, when institutions hold a 
larger fraction of the market, they may contribute to volatility.
11 Institutions is defined as 
                                                 
10 We use capital expenditure both in the cross-section and time-series. Since capital expenditure is missing 
for many firms, using it in the analysis reduces the sample and we do not report the results here. However, 
capital expenditure is not significant in the cross-section and the time-series (once lagged volatility is 
included). 
11 A related but opposite view is that the broadening of the investor base may actually lead to a reduction in 
volatility. This would be in line with the recent of evidence of Umutlu et al. (2010) that the increasing 
degree of financial liberalization lead to a broader investor base and causes a reduction in the total volatility 
of stock returns.   18




  We supplement the variables discussed above, which have all been considered in 
the literature, with an additional variable that has been ignored but is nonetheless crucial 
for studying volatility: turnover. The relationship between trading volume (or turnover) 
and price volatility is well documented. In 1987, Karpoff (1987) discusses 19 articles 
studying this empirical link. The information flow induced volume-volatility link has 
been motivated theoretically by Epps and Epps (1976), Tauchen and Pitts (1983), Admati 
and Pfleiderer (1988) and Foster and Viswanathan (1990). Some of the more recent 
empirical studies include Lamoureux and Lastrapes (1994), Richardson and Smith 
(1994), Foster and Viswanathan (1995), Fleming, Kirby and Ostdiek (2006), and Chuang 
et al. (2009). Curiously, despite the rich theoretical and empirical literature on the role of 
trading volume on volatility it has been essentially ignored in the debate about 
idiosyncratic volatility at the turn of the Millennium. This omission is important because 
the common explanatory variables are correlated with turnover, and their significance 
may be due to an omitted variables bias. In fact the only two papers in this literature that 
control for turnover in the analysis are Brown and Kapadia (2007) and Brandt et al. 
(2010) but they do so only in the cross-section. We rectify this oversight and include 
turnover as a putative explanatory variable, alleviating concerns that previous results may 
                                                 
12 Our data on the level of institutional ownership starts in 1980. To avoid exclusion of the period prior to 
1980, we set the institutional variable to zero during those years. To mitigate the bias from this procedure 
(because there were institutional stockholders prior to 1980), we include a dummy variable in both the 
time-series and cross-sections regressions that takes the value unity in the period of unobserved 
institutional ownership. We also re-run all analyses of the paper using only post-1979 data. As there is no 
qualitative difference in the cross-section and post-1979 analyses we do not report it, but it is available 
from the authors.    19
be resulting from an omitted variables bias.
13 We define the variable Turnover as the 
average monthly turnover in the firm’s stock in a given quarter.
14 
 
4. Cross-sectional analysis 
We start our analysis of the cross-sectional determinants of volatility using a 
panel regression approach. As noted above, we are particularly interested in 
understanding the curious behavior in the late 1990s. We therefore partition our sample 
into two sub-periods: the period before 1995 and the period after 1994. We choose to 
partition the sample at the start of 1995 because it appears from Figure 1 to be around the 
time where the “hump” begins. Also, our sample ends in the first quarter 2005, which 
gives exactly 10 years of data in the post-1994 era.
15  
Table 4 presents some descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent 
variables during the two sub-periods. We observe that quarterly volatility levels increased 
from a median of 3% in the pre-1995 period to a median of 5% in the post-1994 period. 
Interestingly, there is no apparent change in the standard deviation in volatility between 
the two sub-periods. Other changes in firms’ characteristics are also observed in the table. 
Turnover levels have more than doubled, increasing from a median of 34% to a median 
                                                 
13 We also note that some other explanatory variables can be indirectly motivated by turnover. For example, 
Campbell et al. (2001) discuss the contemporaneous increase in the level of institutional ownership and 
idiosyncratic volatility in terms of common trading behavior and the increase in day trading as potential 
explanations. Similarly, firms that have more uncertainty about future profitability tend to have higher 
turnover levels since there is more heterogeneity in beliefs about their future performance (Harris and 
Raviv, 1993; Kraus and Smith, 1996). Therefore, we can also motivate turnover as a control variable.  
14 In addition, to make sure that turnover is not simply proxing for liquidity (which may be a component of 
stock return as in Amihud (2002) and Acharya and Pedersen (2005)), we have also constructed the Amihud 
(2002) illiquidity measure. The measure and its affect in the cross-sectional analysis are discussed in 
footnote 16. 
15 Varying somewhat (i.e., a year or two) the quarter we partition on does not materially affect our results. 
By also analyzing each sub-period separately, we are effectively following the approach of Schwert (2002) 
who also paid particular attention to the period in which the unusual behavior of volatility occurred.  
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of 71%. The median age (recall that we Winsorized at 30) had decreased from 14.3 years 
to 11.1 years. Thus it appears that the increase in IPO activity reduced the average age of 
listed firms. Maba has also increased by about 20% from a median of 1.13 in the pre-
1995 period to a median of 1.33 in the post-1994 period. There are also clearly evident 
changes in ROE and VOLP. There seems to be dramatically more variation in these two 
variables in the post-1994 period as compared with the pre-1995 period. Finally, the 
increase in institutional ownership is substantial, increasing from 17.62% in the early 
period to a level of 40.26% in the post-1994 period.  
Regarding our indicator variables, we observe that the number of Nasdaq traded 
stocks has increased dramatically. While these represent only 24% of sample firms in the 
pre-1995 period, they constitute 53% in the post-1994 period. Similar to Fama and 
French’s (2001) observation, we find that non-dividend paying firms constitute 60% of 
the sample firms in the post-1994 period. There are also almost twice as many low priced 
stocks in the post-1994 period as in the pre-1995 period, while the percentage of non-
regulated firms seems to have decreased somewhat over time. 
Taken together, the summary statistics indicates that all of the characteristics, 
with the possible exception of the number of non-regulated firms, have changed 
dramatically. Further, the directions of the changes in all the variables, except for the 
number of regulated firms, are in the right direction to provide a reasonable explanation 
for the increase in volatility.  
We next turn to the correlation coefficients between the different explanatory 
variables used in the study. We calculate the correlation coefficients for the pre-1995 and 
post-1994 period separately, and present the average and standard deviation of   21
correlations for each of the sub-samples. The correlations are calculated every quarter 
and standard deviations (in parentheses) are calculated across the quarters in the sub-
sample. Below the diagonal we present averages of correlation for each pair of variables 
in the pre-1995 period, while above the diagonal we repeat the calculation for the post-
1994 period. In Table 5 we can observe that for both sub-periods, the pair-wise 
correlation coefficients have predominantly the same sign in the two sub-samples; 
however the magnitude of the correlations did change in a few cases. In particular, when 
we look at the volatility row and column, the signs of the correlation is always the same; 
however, there are sizeable changes for some of the pairs. The non-regulated dummy 
positive correlation with volatility has increased in the post-1994 period compared with 
the pre-1995 period, suggesting that non-regulated firms have become more volatile over 
time. We observe a similar pattern among Nasdaq firms. Interestingly, the market-to-
book ratio is essentially not correlated with volatility in the pre-1995 period, but has a 
moderate correlation with volatility in the post-1995 period. Finally, the high absolute 
correlation of turnover, age, the no dividend dummy, and VOLP with volatility seem to 
be a rather persistent attribute of the data. Thus, even though we had observed major 
changes in many of the explanatory variables over time, we learn that the variables that 
are highly correlated with volatility (in absolute value) are rather stable through time.
16  
Table 6 provides cross-sectional regressions for the two sub-periods. We 
normalize all our variables so the coefficients can be interpreted as the number of 
standard deviations change in response to a one standard deviation change in the 
independent variable. Because the dependent volatility is heavily skewed (the skewness 
                                                 
16 Note that because institutional ownership is truncated at 1980 because of lack of data; the rank Spearman 
and regular correlations are calculated based on 1980q1-1994q4 data in the pre-1995 sub sample. See also 
footnote 10.   22
statistic is 82.66) we use the natural log of volatility as the dependent variable. Apart 
from the explanatory variables described in the previous section, we also control for Size 
(the market value of the firm’s equity). Because market value is also skewed (a skewness 
coefficient of 16.58) we also take its log.  Because volatility is very persistent we include 
the lag of the dependent variable (Lag volatility) as an independent variable to ensure 
our standard errors are valid. All independent variables are from the previous quarter 
(i.e., lagged), except for turnover, which is a flow variable.
17 We consider a range of 
regression specifications. In specifications (1a), (2a), and (3a) we use firm and quarter 
fixed-effect regressions, while in specifications (2a), (2b), and (2c), we follow Petersen 
(2009) and apply the double clustered standard errors, which correct for both time and 
firm dependency. 
  A number of key results emerge from Table 6. Although the statistical 
significance of the coefficients varies slightly between specifications, both specifications 
provide similar interpretations. While this result may not be terribly surprising given that 
our sample is so large, we stress that the results suggest that the fixed-effect regression 
may be driven by cross-sectional differences rather than by changes through time.
18 
Further, the results in both sub-periods are quite similar, suggesting that the importance 
of the variables for explaining volatility in the cross-section has not changed dramatically 
over time. The most important explanatory variable is lagged volatility, which explains 
about 35% of the variation in volatility in the fixed-effect specifications and about 60% 
of the variation in the clustered errors specifications. Also, the coefficient of lagged 
                                                 
17 The qualitative nature of the results is not affected by using the contemporaneous explanatory variables.  
18 Though the fixed-effect specification of Table 5 provides slightly different estimates, the sign and 
significance of the coefficients yield essentially the same results as the double clustered or Fama-McBeth 
(1973) specifications (not provided, but available from the authors on request).    23
volatility is more statistically significant than any other coefficient. Turnover is the 
second most robust variable.
19 It accounts for about 15-20% of the variation depending 
on the time and specification.  The third most significant coefficient is the low price 
indicator, which accounts for an average of 10% of the variation in volatility. Size also 
accounts for an average of 10% of the variation in volatility, but its coefficient is much 
less significant than that of low price, turnover or lagged volatility. The coefficients of 
age, no dividend, and Nasdaq are also significant (with the expected sign) but seem to 
jointly explain less than 10% of the variation in volatility. Also, the Nasdaq coefficient is 
much more significant in the post-1994 period than in the pre-1995 period. Volatility in 
fundamentals, which is represented by the coefficients of ROE and VOLP, also explains 
some of the variation in volatility, and both coefficients are very significant (with the 
expected sign). As one may expect, non-regulated firms seem to exhibit a somewhat 
higher volatility level, but the coefficient is not significant in the pre-1995 period when 
using the fixed-effect specification. Finally, in both sub-periods, the coefficient of Maba 
is negative and statistically significant in the fixed-effect specifications, and is positive 
but insignificant in the clustered errors specifications. These results indicate that market-
to-book is not an important variable for explaining firm-level volatility in the cross-
section. We also find that institutional ownership is negatively correlated with volatility, 
                                                 
19 We also ran Table 6 with Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure, defined as the absolute daily return divided 
by the daily volume. We used this measure in both specification (clustered and firm fixed-effects) and 
results were rather similar. For example in the full sample with double clustering we got that (1) the 
coefficient on the Amihud measure was positive (t-stat of 7.14) and the coefficient of turnover increased 
significantly (t-stat of 22.76). (2) In a regression with all variables excluding turnover – the Amihud 
measure is marginally significant (t-stat of 1.89). Overall, because the significance of the Amihud measure 
is much lower than turnover, these results suggest that liquidity is not a major determinant of volatility, but 
other related volume reasons as discussed are important in explaining volatility.   24
which is counter to the small-sample S&P 500 results of Xu and Malkiel (2003).
20  
Summarizing the results of Tables 4, 5, and 6, we find that the relation between 
the different variables and firm-level volatility is persistent across the different 
methodological approaches and different time periods. We find that most of the 
explanations proposed in the literature provide some explanatory power over and above 
lagged volatility; though, the coefficient on lagged volatility is by far the most 
significant. We find that turnover is the second most robust variable and the low price 
indicator is the third most robust variable. Other variables that are consistent with their 
respective explanations include: age, no dividend, Nasdaq, VOLP, ROE, and not-
regulated. We find that the coefficients on Maba and institutions are either negatively 
significant or not significant, which is counter to the explanations provided by Cao et al. 
(2008) and Xu and Malkiel (2003) respectively.  
Note that although the cross-sectional analysis indicates the importance of the 
different variables in determining firm-level volatility, it is unable to identify those 
variables that are responsible for the time-series behavior of volatility. Most of the 
variables provide similar explanatory power in both sub-samples, and both have changed 
over time. Further, as there is a high correlation between the different explanations, a 
careful time-series analysis is necessary.  
 
5. Time-series analysis  
It is important to note that panel-regression results are mainly driven by cross-
                                                 
20 We note that Xu and Malkiel (2003) only controlled for size in their cross-sectional analysis. To make 
sure that the negative coefficient of institutions is not caused because of the zero value in the pre-1980 
years, we rerun the first sub sample period excluding the observation that predate 1980. The point estimate 
on institutions’ coefficient is similar in magnitude and sign.     25
sectional variation and this cross-sectional variation will also tend to appear in firm fixed-
effect regressions. This is because the number of cross-sectional observations is very 
large relative to the number of time-series observations. This suggests that although a 
variable may appear statistically significant in the cross-sectional regression it does not 
necessarily have any explanatory power for the time-series variation in average volatility.  
Our approach therefore is to track changes in aggregate volatility with changes in 
aggregate measures. Previous studies following this approach (Fink et al., 2006; Wei and 
Zhang, 2006; Brown and Kapadia, 2007; Cao et al., 2008; Irvine and Pontiff, 2009) are 
almost always univariate in nature. The content of such a univariate analysis is also 
contained in the simple time-series plots of the underlying variables. Furthermore, given 
the high correlation between the alternative conditioning variables we must be cautious in 
interpreting the results because of potential omitted variables bias. In contrast, we employ 
a multivariate analysis and compare these results with the univariate estimates. 
         We aggregate all our variables following the Campbell et al. (2001) methodology. 
Value-weighted measures are computed as 
  VWt  witmit
i1
Nt
 , (3) 
where  t VW  is the aggregated value-weighted measure at time t,  it w  is the weight of firm i 
at the end of quarter t-1 (measured in terms of market value),  it m  is the measure of firm i 
calculated at the end of quarter t or during quarter t depending of the type of measure 
(i.e., stock or flow), and Nt denotes the number of firms at time t. The indicator variables 
we employed in the cross-section analysis lend themselves to easy interpretation when 
value-weighted. Nasdaq translates to the market portion (percentage) attributed to Nasdaq   26
traded firms. The no dividend indicator translates to the market portion (percentage) 
attributed to non-dividend paying firms; the low price indicator translates to the market 
portion (percentage) of firms whose price is less than $10; and the not regulated indicator 
translates to the market portion (percentage) of firms classified to non-regulated 
industries.   
 
5.1. Time-series evidence 
In Panel A of Table 7, we compute the sample mean and standard deviation for 
the value-weighted sample in the pre-1995 and post-1994 sample periods. Similarly to 
the results in the cross-section, the average level of volatility is much higher in the post-
1994 data—being nearly twice the size. We observe that the level of many of the 
variables differ dramatically between the earlier periods, which is similar to the cross-
sectional results reported in Table 4. The large change occurs for all variables except age, 
ROE, and the not regulated and low price dummies. The absence of a dramatic change in 
the market value of low priced stock is particularly interesting (it increased from 1.86% 
to 2.06%) because Table 3 revealed that the fraction of low priced stocks had increased 
dramatically (from 27% of the sample in the pre-1995 period to 47% of the sample in the 
post-1994 period). This suggests that the speculative episode explanation may not have 
much explanatory power for the trend in value-weighted volatility. 
Figure 1 plots the time series of value-weighted volatility measures. It is clearly 
apparent that the volatility trend documented by Campbell et al. (2001), whose data 
terminated in 1999, was actually a “hump” around the turn of the Millennium. In Figure 2 
we plot the time-series of each value-weighted average of the ten conditioning variables   27
of interest. The most striking observations are the high correlation between many of the 
variables. This is born out by the sample correlation of the value-weighted variables in 
Panel B of Table 7.  While the cross-sectional correlations between the variables are not 
terribly large (in absolute value), we do observe high correlations between many of the 
value-weighted variables (in absolute value). The correlation between the different 
explanatory variables and turnover is particularly high. Except for ROE and low price, 
turnover has a correlation of about 0.7 or above (in absolute value) with any other 
explanatory variables. Most relevant for the attempt to explain the volatility “hump” is 
the peak around 2000-2001 evident in Figure 2 in the time-series of Turnover, Maba, 
NASDAQ, no dividend, and age (where, we can observe a corresponding dump in 2000-
2001) variables. This high correlation between the different explanatory variables calls 
for caution in interpreting the results from time-series tests, as it raises concerns about 
both multicollinearity and omitted variables bias. Figures 1 and 2 also clearly identify the 
radically different behavior of many aspects of the stock market in the late 1990s and 
early part of the new Millennium.  
In Table 8 we report the results of a regression of value-weighted average 
volatility on a range of conditioning variables.
21 We first run univariate regressions on 
each of the ten explanatory variables and then a multivariate regression using all 
variables jointly. The Durbin-Watson statistic is recorded in the last row of the table and 
all models, except specification (11), exhibit strong positive serial correlation (i.e. the 
DW statistics are less than 2), suggesting miss-specification.
22 To account for this serial 
                                                 
21 As noted above all stock variables are lagged one-quarter. The results reported are basically unchanged if 
one runs the regression with the contemporaneous variables, which is not surprising since all of the stock 
variables are highly persistent.  
22 The evidence of serial correlation is similar when we use the Ljung-Box test also.   28
correlation we compute the standard errors following Newey and West (1987) using 3 
lags (recall we are using quarterly observations). We report three adjusted R-squared in 
Table 8 (and later also in Table 9) – the first adjusted R-squared is for the same 
specification regression if we were to run the regression only for the pre-1995 period, the 
second adjusted R-squared is for the same specification regression if we were to run the 
regression only for the post-1994 period, while the third R-squared is that of the full 
sample, whose estimators are tabulated.
23 The fit of the univariate regressions as 
measured by adjusted R-squared varies substantially between sub periods and across 
variables. While the variables explanatory power is very low for the pre-1995 period, 
several of the variables are quite successful in explaining volatility in the post-1994 
period. The best fit for the pre-1995 years is provided by the Low price (adjusted R-
squared of 4.84%) and not regulated (adjusted R-squared of 3.85%) - however even these 
fits are rather low. For the pre-1995 years we learn that for some specification, the 
adjusted R-squared (no dividend, Nasdaq, VOLP, ROE) are actually negative, suggesting 
that the variables do not provide any explanatory power for the volatility trend in that 
period. As we conjectured, the variables that best fit the trend do so mostly because of the 
post-1994 period. The best fit is Maba, which generates an adjusted R-squared above 36 
percent for the full sample. This result is similar to that of Cao et al. (2008). Three other 
variables do a moderately good job in explaining the trend over the entire period: 
turnover, age and no dividend, whose regressions have an adjusted R-squared of 23-25 
percent.  Other variables have a much lower adjusted R-squared and/or produce results 
                                                 
23 To preserve space we provide only Adj. R-squared for the sub-period regressions. The coefficients of 
most variables in the pre-1995 period are insignificant, while the coefficient of the variables in the post-
1994 period tend to provide similar interpretation as the full sample results provide. The only two 
significant coefficients in the pre-1995 period in the univariate regressions are those of not regulated and 
Low price, which are significant at the 5%.   29
that are inconsistent with their theoretical motivation. ROE is able to explain only 5 
percent of the variation and has a positive and statistically significant coefficient, which 
is counter to the explanation that higher ROEs should reduce volatility. VOLP is only 
marginally significant with t-statistic less than 2. Similarly, the value of non-regulated 
firms is negatively correlated with average volatility. The low price variable, which had 
much explanatory power in the cross-sectional regression, has zero explanatory power in 
a time-series context. The institutional ownership coefficient has the right sign, but a 
relatively low adjusted R-squared of around 8 percent. This result, taken together with the 
negative correlation we found in the cross-section regressions, suggests that institutional 
ownership cannot account for the trend. The multivariate regression produces an 
impressive adjusted R-squared of over 67 percent; however, we must be cautious in 
interpreting the results because of concerns about multicollinearity. Note that the 
coefficient of Nasdaq, no dividend, not regulated, and institutions (and interestingly its 
dummy variable) flip sign, suggesting that there may be some omitted variables bias in 
the univariate results. Interestingly the point estimate and statistical significance of 
turnover increases in the multivariate regression (the coefficient increases from 0.0283 to 
0.1022 and the t-statistic increases from 2.7 to 8.8), suggesting that turnover is a 
particularly important determinant of the trend. Interestingly the multivariate regression 
has much lower serial correlation (i.e. DW close to 2) than the univariate regressions. 
To further address the issue of serial correlation we include a lag of average 
volatility in the regression, whose results we report in Table 9.
24 Note the dramatic 
                                                 
24 These time-series regression tests regress a highly persistent variable (i.e. average volatility) on highly 
persistent variables (e.g. average age or book-to-market). In a simulation experiment (available from the 
authors upon request), we demonstrate that inference in this context suffers from a spurious regressions 
problem related to the work of Ferson et al. (2003). We find that using Newey-West standard errors, as is   30
reduction in serial correlation as the DW statistics are quite close to 2, particularly in the 
turnover and full-blown multivariate specifications. The R-square of the base AR(1) 
model (the first column) for the full sample is 38 percent, exceeding all of the previous 
univariate regressions. Interestingly, lagged volatility is much more important for the 
post-1994 years than the pre-1995 years. Note that for a variable to have a marginal 
contribution, the adjusted R-squared has to be more than 5.04% and 52.54% for the pre-
1995 and post-1994 periods respectively. It would be fair to say that we find a dramatic 
increase in the model fit after adding the predictors, especially for the post-1994 period. 
The best fitting individual explanatory variable is Maba with an adjusted R-squared of 47 
percent for the full sample, followed by turnover with an adjusted R-squared of about 44 
percent. We also observe that after the inclusion of lagged volatility, the coefficient of the 
variable VOLP, which was marginally significant in Table 8, is not significant in Table 9. 
However, age, no dividend, and Nasdaq remain significant (with the correct sign), and 
yield similar adjusted R-squared in the range of 41-42 percent.  The results with regard to 
the full-blown regression are similar to those reported in Table 8. After including all 
variables the point estimate of turnover increases more than six-fold from 0.0158 to 
0.0989 and the t-statistic more than doubles. We also observe that accounting for 
turnover, age, dividend policy, Nasdaq, and market-to-book (i.e., specifications (2)-(6)) 
causes a dramatic decrease in the coefficient on lagged volatility (decreasing from about 
0.6 in the univariate to around 0.5 in the bivariate regressions), though the other variables 
(i.e., volatility of profitability, ROE, regulated dummy, institutions, and price) do not 
affect the autocorrelation coefficient. Finally in the full-blown multivariate model lagged-
                                                                                                                                                 
routinely done in the current literature, is an inadequate response to the problem of autocorrelated residuals 
that arises in this context. However, simply including lagged average volatility as an explanatory variable is 
successful in correcting the standard errors and thus inference in this context.   31
volatility is no longer statistically significant.   
A quick perusal of Figure 1 leaves no doubt that October 1987 is an outlier. 
Because the number of observation in the time-series analysis is relatively small (128 
observations), we want to make sure that this outlier does not drive our results. Therefore, 
as a robustness check, which we do not tabulate, we allow the intercept to differ in Q4-
1987 and rerun the specification of Table 9. While the R-squared of all the specifications 
increase substantially (i.e., the Maba and turnover regression yield an R-squared of 64 
percent and 69 percent respectively), there seems to be little difference in terms of the 
interpretation of the results.  
Another way to control for possible outliers in the value-weighted measures 
would be to fit a regression by calculation Cook’s D (Cook's D can be thought of as a 
general measure of observation influence) and excluding observation for which D is high. 
In Table 10 we follow Rousseeuw and Leroy (2003) in constructing robust regressions 
that calculate case weights from absolute residuals, and regresses again using those 
weights. Iterations stop when the maximum change in weights drops below a tolerance 
level. The convergence procedure we employ includes Huber weighting and biweighting. 
In Huber weighting, observations with small residuals get a weight of 1, the larger the 
residual, the smaller the weight.  With biweighting, all cases with a non-zero residual get 
down-weighted at least a little.  The two different kinds of weight are used because Huber 
weights can have difficulties with severe outliers, and biweights can have difficulties 
converging or may yield multiple solutions.  In short, the most influential points are 
dropped, and then cases with large absolute residuals are down-weighted. 
 The significance of the results is similar to those in Table 8. In particular the   32
three most important variables of specification (12) of Table 8 are Turnover, Maba, and 
low price. 
Finally, we test for the structural break in the data. Initially, we have asserted the 
break is at the end of 1994, but that observation was based on graphical methods and ad 
hoc sample splits are not very reliable. We therefore conduct in Table 11 a structural 
break analysis. The table provides the Elliott and Müller (2006) test statistic for time 
varying coefficients in a model where volatility is regressed on turnover, no dividend, 
Maba, and Nasdaq  and age (these are the variables in Table 9 that come significant when 
used in the univariate regression with  lag volatility). The test contrasts a stable 
regression model with an unstable alternative where the independent variables 
coefficients are a function of time. This very general specification nests many of the 
'structural break' and 'time varying parameter' models in the literature, allowing for 
almost any pattern of variation in the coefficients of the independent variables. The null 
is that all regressions coefficients are fixed over time.  We run the test for the period 
before the cut-off period and after the cut-period in order to find a cut-off date in which 
both sub periods reject the null. Interestingly, we find that our cut-off period was more or 
less on the point. The structural break test shows that either 1994q4 or 1995q1 are the 
only quarters where we cannot reject the null for both sub periods at the 10% level.
25 
We next account for the break in the relationships between the variables in 1995. 
We allow for the intercept and the coefficients on all parameters to change after the end 
of 1994. The parameter estimates are reported in Table 12. For each model specification 
we report the estimate pre-break in the first column, and the change in the parameters 
post-break is reported in the second column. In the interest of saving space, we report the 
                                                 
25 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting the analysis of the structural break.   33
results for the two most robust variables in the time series (i.e., turnover and Maba) and a 
full blown regression specification.
26 
 Given the “hump” in the last decade, it should not be surprising that one can 
reject the null hypothesis of no-structural break.
27 We observe that the coefficients on 
both variables are statistically significant in the post-1994 period, but are insignificant in 
the pre-1995 period. These results persist no matter whether one includes lagged 
volatility in the specification or not. While not reported, we find that the coefficients of 
other variables that track average volatility well (i.e., Nasdaq, no dividend, and age) are 
significant in the post-1994 period but not in the pre-1995 period. It seems that the 
“hump” in volatility is an unusual period, when many firm characteristics were associated 
with changes in volatility. This suggests the conclusion that the different explanations 
provided in the literature are essentially capturing the variation in volatility during the 
last decade rather than being explanations of the trend in volatility over the three decades. 
Comparing the importance of Maba and turnover, Maba seems to track volatility 
marginally better as in the lagged volatility specification it produces an adjusted R-
squared of 52 percent, while the turnover specification provides for an adjusted R-
squared of 49 percent. However, we note in the last 2 columns of Table 12, which report 
the multivariate tests, that Maba is only marginally significant (t-statistic of 1.66), while 
turnover is highly significant (t-statistic of 5.72). We reiterate that because there is such 
high correlation between the explanatory variables we have a trade-off between a 
univariate and bivariate regressions that suffer from omitted variables and a multivariate 
                                                 
26 In a different analysis, we run the regressions of table 8 and 9 for the pre-1995 and post-1994 period 
separately. The results are qualitatively similar; in particular, the R-squared for the pre-1995 are close to 
zero. 
27 To conserve space we omit the tests but these are available from the authors on request.    34
regression analysis that suffers from the high correlation between the independent 
variables (and the high standard errors associated with it). We therefore should exercise 
caution when interpreting the results. However, taking into consideration all results, it 
seems that turnover has two important qualities for explaining the trend: it has a high 
correlation with volatility and yields a high Adj. R-squared in the univariate and bivariate 
regressions; and it “survives” the full blown regression specifications. Note that in the 
specification (6) of Table 11, lag volatility is completely driven out, and many of the 
other variables, who in the univariate specifications are correlated with the trend (age, no 
dividend, Nasdaq, VOLP), either flip sign or become insignificant.  
 
6. Conclusions 
We have studied the curious behavior of volatility during the turn of the 
Millennium. Contrary to the current literature, which has proposed many explanations to 
the trend in volatility, we concentrate our effort on empirically testing the relevance of 
the major proxies used in past studies. We conduct both a cross-sectional and time-series 
analyses as a viable explanation of the trend should also be related to firm-level level 
volatility.  
We find that two recent explanations to the trend fail in either the time-series or 
cross-sectional context. The explanation of Brandt et al (2010) that idiosyncratic 
volatility changes are associated with retail investors’ attraction to low stock prices fails 
in the time-series; while the explanation of Cao et al. (2008) that the increase in 
idiosyncratic volatility is associated with changes in managerial growth options fails in 
the cross-section.    35
Our results suggest that these studies claims that they have identified important 
determinants of the observed patterns in volatility over time are somewhat overstated. We 
believe that Brandt et al. (2010) evidence should be interpreted as another explanation 
associated with firm level volatility, whose economic contribution to the overall trend in 
volatility is limited. It is quite puzzling that the strong time-series evidence in Cao et al. 
(2008) fails to materialize in the cross-section. 
Overall our results suggest that it is difficult to claim that a specific explanation is 
the driver for the changes in volatility levels. Rather, we find that the variables most 
associated with the tech-bubble are important both in the time-series and cross-section 
analyses (e.g., Nasdaq classification indicator, dividend payment indicator, and age). 
Also, our time-series analysis suggests a structural break around 1995, which leads to an 
unusual “hump” in both volatility and many firm characteristics that are related to the 
technology run up and following melt down. These characteristics are not useful in 
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Figure 1: All measures are value-weighed and quarterly calculated over all NYSE-
AMEX-Nasdaq firms. Volatility is the sum of daily return squared. Excess industry 
volatility is the sum of excess return (daily return minus the corresponding Fama-French 
industry return). Four-factor is the sum of squared residual when a firm’s daily return is 
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Figure 2: Time-series plot of value-weighted average of the explanatory variables  




We summarize the explanation provided in previous studies including the variable analyzed, the conditioning variables used in cross-sectional and time-
series regressions, and the way standard errors are computed for the time-series regressions. ROE is return on equity; VOLP is the time series volatility 
of ROE (typically based on 12 lags). Bold explanatory variable are proxies for the particular explanation provided in the paper. CLMX refers to the 
usage of the Campbell et al. (2001) methodology. 
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Table 2 
Correlations and Rank Spearman Correlations between Volatility Measures 
 
The table provides correlations (which are bold it they are significantly different than zero) and their corresponding 
rank (Spearman) correlations (in italics). The “sample”  corresponds to all American firms traded on NYSE, AMEX 
and Nasdaq that have no missing values for all conditional variables (in a given quarter) used in this study. The 
population includes all firms traded on NYSE, AMEX and Nasdaq that have return data on the daily and monthly 
CRSP datasets. In panel A, the volatility measures are firm specific and the correlations are purely cross-sectional 
(the standard deviation of the correlation across quarters is provided in parenthesis below). Below the diagonal we 
provide the sample correlations (between the log variables), while above the diagonal we provide the population 
correlations. All measures are calculated each quarter during the period 1973q1-2005q1.Volatility is the sum of 
squared daily returns in a given quarter. Excess market is the sum of squared daily excess market return. Excess 
industry is the sum of squared daily excess industry return (based on the 49 Fama-French industries).  Four-factors – 
is the sum of daily squared errors when firm returns are regressed on the four-factors model (as in Brown and 
Kapadia, 2007). In Panel B below the diagonal we value weighted all measures the same way as done in Campbell 
et al. (2001). We provide time-series correlation and rank Spearman correlation based on all 128 quarters, while in 
parenthesis we calculate the correlation excluding quarter 1987q4. Above the diagonal we provide the same 
information for the equal-weighted measures.  
 
Panel A: Cross Section Correlations
 Volatility 
 
Excess market  Excess industry  Four-factors 
Volatility 
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Table 4 
Cross-Section Distribution  - Before and After 1995  
 
The sample includes all American firms traded on NYSE, AMEX and Nasdaq that have no missing observations in a 
given quarter. The sample has 5995 firms in the period 1973q1-1994q4, and 8986 firms in the period 1995q1-
2005q1. Volatility is the volatility calculated as in Campbell et al (2001) based on daily returns. Turnover is the 
monthly average turnover (number of shares traded divided by number of shares outstanding). Age is the number of 
years since firm share appears on CRSP. Maba is market to book value of equity as calculated in Cao et al. (2008). 
VOLP is the variance of quarterly ROEs (Wei and Zhang, 2006). Institution is the combined holdings of all 
institutional investors. For indicator variables the mean value is provided. The indicator variables are: Nasdaq equals 
1 if the firm is traded on Nasdaq; No dividend equals 1 if the firm did not pay dividend during the quarter (compustat 
item 16 is zero); Low price equals 1 if the firm’s share price is lower than $10 at the end of the quarter; Not regulated 







p1 p5  p25  p50  p75  p95  p99 
Volatility 
 
0.06 0.24  0.00  0.01  0.02  0.03 0.07 0.20 0.51 
Turnover 
 
0.54 0.67  0.03  0.07  0.18  0.34 0.64 1.66 3.39 
Age 
 
15.74 9.00  2.16  3.50  7.92  14.35 22.68 30.00  30.00 
Maba 
 
1.43 0.89  0.68  0.76  0.97  1.13 1.54 3.06 5.85 
VOLP 
 
0.03 0.05  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.01 0.03 0.11 0.30 
ROE 
 
0.02 0.07  -0.37 -0.06  0.02  0.03 0.05 0.08 0.16 
Institution 
 
22.90 22.65  0.00  0.00  0.00  17.62 40.17 65.04 77.01 
Dummy mean 
 
Nasdaq 0.24  No 
dividend 









p1 p5  p25  p50  p75  p95  p99 
Volatility 
 
0.11 0.25  0.00  0.01  0.02  0.05 0.11 0.37 0.88 
Turnover 
 
1.18 1.42  0.05  0.12  0.36  0.71 1.41 3.91 7.64 
Age 
 
14.08 9.43  2.08  3.25  5.92  11.09 22.68 30.00  30.00 
Maba 
 
1.84 1.32  0.68  0.83  1.06  1.33 2.03 4.96 6.90 
VOLP 
 
0.04 0.07  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.02 0.05 0.17 0.37 
ROE 
 
0.00 0.11  -0.50 -0.20 -0.00 0.02 0.04 0.09 0.21 
Institution 
 
41.64 27.48  0.17  2.13  17.21  40.26 63.89 86.48 98.28 
Dummy mean 
 
Nasdaq 0.53  No 
dividend 
0.60 Low  price  0.47  Not 
regulated 
0.73    47
Table 5 
Cross-Section Correlation - Before and After 1995  
 
The sample includes all American firms traded on NYSE, AMEX and Nasdaq that have no missing observations in a given 
quarter. The sample has 5995 firms in the period 1973q1-1994q4, and 8986 firms in the period 1995q1-2005q1. Under the 
diagonal the table provides the average correlation in a given quarter (which is in bold if it is significantly greater than zero), the 
rank Spearman correlation (in italics), and the standard deviation of correlations (in parenthesis) for the period 1973q1-1994q4 
(except of Inst, where the correlations are calculated for the period 1980q1-1994q4); above the diagonal, the same tabulation is 
provided for the period 1995q1-2005q1. Volatility is the log of the volatility calculated as in Campbell et al (2001) based on daily 
returns. Turnover is the monthly average turnover (number of shares traded divided by number of shares outstanding). Age is the 
number of years since firm share appears on CRSP. Maba is market to book value of equity as calculated in Cao et al. (2008). 
VOLP is the variance of quarterly ROEs (Wei and Zhang, 2006). Inst is the combined holdings of all institutional investors. The 
indicator variables are: Nasdaq equals 1 if the firm is traded on Nasdaq; No dividend equals 1 if the firm did not pay dividend 
during the quarter (compustat item 16 is zero); Low price equals 1 if the firm’s share price is lower than $10 at the end of the 




Turnover Age  No 
dividend 
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Table 6 
The Cross-Section Determinants of Volatility – Before and After 1995 
 
The sample has 5995 firms in the period 1973q1-1994q4, and 8968 firms in the period 1995q1-2005q1. The 
table provides cross sectional regression for the different periods using (a) firm and quarter fixed-effects, and 
(b) double clustered stand errors as in Petersen (2009). Volatility is the log of the volatility calculated as in 
Campbell et al (2001) based on daily returns. Turnover is the monthly average turnover (number of shares 
traded divided by number of shares outstanding). Size is the log of the market value of the firm’s common 
shares. Age is the number of years since firm share appears on CRSP. Maba is market to book value of equity as 
calculated in Cao et al. (2008). VOLP is the variance of quarterly ROEs (Wei and Zhang, 2006). Institution is 
the combined holdings of all institutional investors. The indicator variables are: Nasdaq equals 1 if the firm is 
traded on Nasdaq; No dividend equals 1 if the firm did not pay dividend during the quarter (compustat item 16 
is zero); Low price equals 1 if the firm’s share price is lower than $10 at the end of the quarter; Not regulated 
equals 1 if the firm is not classified to an industry whose first SIC code is 4 or 6 (financials and regulated).All 





















































































































































































observations  119,344 119,344 127,263 127,263 246,607 246,607 
 
R-squared    0.7335 0.6902 0.7132 0.7237 0.7485 0.7186 
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Table 7 
Summary Statistics of Value-Weighted Averaged Time-Series Variables  
 
Descriptive statistics of the value-weighted volatility and value-weighted averages of the ten conditioning variables. Panel A reports the mean and 
standard deviation for the full sample, the sub period 1973q1-1994q4, and the sub period 1995q1-2005q1respectively. Panel B provides correlation and 
Spearman correlation (above the diagonal)  matrix of the full sample of value-weighted variables. Firm-level variables used to derive value-weighted 
variables are: volatility is calculated as in Campbell et al (2001) based on daily returns. Turnover is the monthly average turnover (number of shares 
traded divided by number of shares outstanding). Age is the number of years since firm share appears on CRSP. Maba is market to book value of equity 
as calculated in Cao et al. (2008). VOLP is the variance of quarterly ROEs (Wei and Zhang, 2006). Institution is the combined holdings of all 
institutional investors. The indicator variables are: Nasdaq equals 1 if the firm is traded on Nasdaq; No dividend equals 1 if the firm did not pay 
dividend during the quarter (compustat item 16 is zero); Low price equals 1 if the firm’s share price is lower than $10 at the end of the quarter; Not 
regulated equals 1 if the firm is not classified to an industry whose first SIC code is 4 or 6 (financials and regulated). 
Panel A 
 Volatility  Turnover  Age  No 
dividend 




Mean  0.0288 0.6447  23.3392  0.1277 0.0923 2.0048 0.0203 0.0422 0.7643 38.7403  0.0193 
SD  0.0200 0.3603 0.8381 0.0895 0.0782 0.6168 0.0079 0.0074 0.0644 21.3886  0.0098 
Mean  (Pre-1995)  0.0234 0.4417  23.6950  0.0730 0.0498 1.7005 0.0177 0.0400 0.7869 30.5901  0.0186 
SD (Pre-1995)  0.0139 0.2018 0.6847 0.0335 0.0518 0.3705 0.0078 0.0061 0.0649 21.4382  0.0093 
Mean (Post-1994)  0.0401 1.0754  22.5841  0.2439 0.1826 2.6504 0.0259 0.0468 0.7164 56.0346  0.0206 
SD (Post-1994)  0.0257 0.2117 0.6022 0.0519 0.0373 0.5332 0.0044 0.0079 0.0249  3.6477 0.0107 
Panel B
Volatility    0.3683 -0.3687 0.3729 0.3071 0.4779 0.3437 0.1621 0.0537 0.3129 0.1849 
Turnover  0.5094    -0.8881 0.9316 0.9563 0.6953 0.8500 0.2232 -0.7639 0.7361 0.1491 
Age  -0.4883 -0.8361    -0.8807 -0.8964 -0.7102 -0.7478 -0.2662 0.6305 -0.8444 -0.1392 
No dividend  0.4964  0.934 -0.8173    0.9673 0.8385 0.8260 0.2507 -0.7538 0.9435 0.2568 
Nasdaq  0.4388 0.9408 -0.8705 0.9459    0.7862 0.8272 0.2702 -0.7879 0.9576 0.2088 
Maba  0.6046 0.6866 -0.7122 0.8168 0.7656    0.6448 0.4550 -0.1300 0.7361 0.1990 
VOLP  0.2425 0.6908 -0.6495 0.6500 0.7357 0.5100    0.0920 -0.7415 0.8425 0.2207 
ROE  0.2384 0.1885 -0.2322 0.3121 0.2521 0.3679 -0.0104    -0.1300 0.2347 -0.1671 
Not regulated  -0.0048 -0.6886 0.4872 -0.6042 -0.7179 -0.2434 -0.6362 -0.0595    -0.8172 -0.2744 
Institutions  0.2390 0.8175 -0.8214 0.6892 0.7928 0.4423 0.7427 0.0932 -0.6706    0.2516 
Low price  0.1129 0.1062 0.0213 0.1423 0.0998 0.0077 0.0883 -0.1111 0.0027 0.0015     50
Table 8 
The Time-Series Determinants of Value-Weighted Average Volatility – Full Sample Results 
 
The sample has 128 observations in the period 1973q1-2005q1. The dependent variable is value-weighted volatility. All variables are defined in Table 
7. Each column contains a different specification of the regression model For each regression the adjusted R-squared from running the same 
specification regression for the pre-1995 and post-1994 periods separately. The table reports the point estimate and Newey-West t-statistics computed 
using 3 lags.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11) 
Intercept  0.0105 0.3011 0.0146 0.0184 -0.0106 0.0163 0.0016 0.0299 -0.0105 0.0243 0.1394 
  (1.84) (3.08) (3.69) (5.44) (-1.25) (3.16) (0.11) (1.53) (-0.72) (4.38) (1.35) 
Turnover  0.0283            0.1022 
  ( 2 . 7 0 )             ( 8 . 7 5 )  
A g e     - 0 . 0 1 1 7            - 0 . 0 0 3 1  
    ( - 2 . 8 3 )            ( - 0 . 8 0 )  
No  dividend     0.1110          -0.0989 
     ( 2 . 8 6 )           ( - 1 . 6 5 )  
Nasdaq      0.1123         -0.0693 
      ( 2 . 4 5 )          ( - 0 . 9 3 )  
Maba       0.0196        0.0201 
       ( 4 . 3 2 )         ( 4 . 5 4 )  
VOLP        0.6136       0.2367 
        ( 1 . 9 8 )        ( 1 . 0 4 )  
ROE         0.6452      0.3577 
         ( 1 . 7 9 )       ( 2 . 2 2 )  
Not  regulated          -0.0015     0.0084 
          ( - 0 . 0 6 )      ( 0 . 2 1 )  
Institution    0.0008 -0.0035 
           ( 2 . 8 3 )     ( - 6 . 1 7 )  
Low  price            0.231  0.5385 
            ( 1 . 2 1 )   ( 4 . 1 7 )  
Pre-1980  Dummy           0.0325    -0.1262 
           ( 2 . 1 5 )     ( - 5 . 1 6 )  
Adj.  R-squared  pre  95  0.0081 0.0134 -0.0097 -0.0117 0.0196 -0.0115 -0.0113 0.0385 0.0013 0.0484 0.2754 
Adj.  R-squared  post  94 0.3865 0.3759 0.3183 0.3953 0.5874 0.0076 -0.0051 0.3244 -0.0003  -0.0201 0.7652 
Adj.  R-squared  0.2536 0.2324 0.2405 0.1861 0.3605 0.0513 0.0494 -0.0079 0.0763 0.0049 0.6771 
DW  0.8757 1.0606 1.0332 0.9427 1.1713 0.8417 0.8379 0.7612 0.8491 0.7900 1.9812 
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Table 9 
The Time-Series Determinants of Value-Weighted Average Volatility – Full Sample Results 
The sample has 128 observations in the period 1973q1-2005q1. The dependent variable is value-weighted volatility. All variables are defined in Table 
7. Each column contains a different specification of the regression model. For each regression the adjusted R-squared is reported along with the Durbin-
Watson statistic (DW), and the R-squared from running the same specification regression for the pre-1995 and post-1994 periods separately. The table 
reports the point estimate and OLS t-statistics.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11) (12) 
Intercept  0.0109 0.0045 0.1482 0.0076 0.0087 -0.0077 0.0072 -0.0039 0.0096 -0.0026 0.0129  0.1200 
  (4.45) (1.57) (3.31) (2.91) (3.44) (-1.74) (1.81) (-0.48) (0.57) (-0.22) (3.83)  (1.15) 
Lag  volatility  0.6192 0.4878 0.4997 0.4944 0.5284 0.4103 0.5968 0.5958 0.6193 0.5831 0.6361  0.1053 
  (8.84) (6.49) (6.39) (6.25) (6.92) (5.31) (8.22) (8.46) (8.80) (7.86) (8.72)  (1.37) 
Turnover    0.0158            0.0989 
    ( 3 . 7 9 )             ( 8 . 3 1 )  
Age     -0.0057           -0.0027 
     ( - 3 . 0 7 )            ( - 0 . 7 1 )  
No  dividend      0.0543          -0.1167 
      ( 3 . 0 7 )           ( - 1 . 9 1 )  
N a s d a q        0 . 0 5 2 4          - 0 . 0 6 7 2  
       ( 2 . 6 8 )          ( - 0 . 9 0 )  
Maba        0.0123        0.0191 
        ( 4 . 9 1 )         ( 4 . 2 6 )  
VOLP         0.2134       0.2273 
         ( 1 . 1 6 )        ( 1 . 0 0 )  
ROE          0.3677      0.3569 
          ( 1 . 9 3 )       ( 2 . 2 2 )  
Not  regulated           0.0017     0.0068 
           ( 0 . 0 8 )      ( 0 . 1 7 )  
Institution            0.0003    -0.0031 
            ( 1 . 2 3 )     ( - 4 . 9 9 )  
Low  price             -0.1258  0.4542 
             ( - 0 . 8 4 )   ( 3 . 1 8 )  
Pre-1980  Dummy            0.0122    -0.1114 
            ( 0 . 9 6 )     ( - 4 . 1 8 )  
Adj. R-squared pre 95  0.0504  0.0551  0.0533  0.0402  0.0391 0.0639 0.0391 0.0680 0.0399 0.0474 0.0617  0.2666 
Adj. R-squared post 94  0.5254  0.6010  0.5561  0.5325  0.5598 0.6564 0.5130 0.5288 0.5931 0.5319 0.5328  0.8054 
Adj.  R-squared  0.3777 0.4374 0.4168 0.4168 0.4069 0.4741 0.3794 0.3909 0.3728 0.3791 0.3763  0.6795 
DW 2.227  2.022  2.1643  2.1148  2.1457  2.0913  2.2025 2.2236 2.2276 2.2054 2.2373  2.1363   52
Table 10 
The Time-Series Determinants of Value-Weighted Average Volatility – Robust Regression Results 
 
The table follows Rousseeuw and Leroy (2003) in constructing robust regressions that calculate case weights from absolute residuals, and 
regresses again using those weights. The weighting is done in two stages. In Huber weighting, observations with small residuals get a 
weight of 1, the larger the residual, the smaller the weight.  With biweighting, all cases with a non-zero residual get down-weighted at least 
a little. Using the Huber weights first helps to minimize problems with convergence when using biweights. Iterations stop when the 
maximum change in weights drops below a tolerance level. The dependent variable is value-weighted volatility. All variables are defined in Table 
7. Each column contains a different specification of the regression model separately. All tables include an intercept. The table reports the point estimate 
t-statistics (in parenthesis). 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11) 
Turnover  0.0096            0.0417 
  ( 4 . 2 2 )             ( 7 . 1 0 )  
A g e     - 0 . 0 0 3 5            - 0 . 0 0 3 3  
    ( - 4 . 0 9 )            ( - 2 . 1 6 )  
No  dividend     0.0505          -0.0809 
     ( 5 . 4 1 )           ( - 2 . 9 2 )  
Nasdaq      0.0272         -0.0693 
      ( 2 . 5 7 )          ( - 0 . 9 3 )  
Maba       0.0108        0.0202 
       ( 8 . 5 1 )         ( 9 . 8 2 )  
VOLP        0.2725       0.1590 
        ( 2 . 7 9 )        ( 1 . 5 8 )  
ROE         0.6452      0.1996 
         ( 1 . 6 9 )       ( 2 . 6 8 )  
Not regulated     0.1876 0.0121 
          ( 2 . 4 6 )      ( 0 . 7 0 )  
Institution           0.0002    -0.00002 
           ( 2 . 7 6 )     ( - 0 . 2 3 )  
Low  price            0.496  0.541 
            ( 6 . 1 1 )   ( 1 0 . 0 7 )  
Pre-1980  Dummy           0.0059    -0.0012 
           ( 1 . 6 4 )     ( - 0 . 4 5 )  
 
    53
 
Table 11 
Detection of Structural Break Analysis 
 
The table provides the Elliott and Müller (2006) test statistic for time varying coefficients where volatility is regressed on turnover, no 
dividend, Maba, and Nasdaq. The test contrasts a stable regression model with an unstable alternative where the independent variables 
coefficients depend are a function of time. This very general specification nests many of the 'structural break' and 'time varying 
parameter' models in the literature, allowing for almost any pattern of variation in the coefficients of the independent variables. The 
null is that all regressions coefficients are fixed over time.  For rejecting the null, the 10% critical value is -23.37, the 5% critical value 
is -25.29, and the 1% critical value is -29.18. In bold we provide values that do not reject the null of no structural break. 
 
  Test for the period preceding  cut-off quarter 
(excluding cut-off quarter) 
Test for the period following cut-off quarter 
(including cut-off quarter) 
  Test statistic  Test statistic 
1990q1  -22.665  -32.297 
1991q1  -22.447  -31.621 
1992q1  -22.306  -31.592 
1993q1  -21.366  -31.602 
1994q1  -21.714  -29.376 
1994q2  -24.286  -29.705 
1994q3  -22.248  -25.555 
1994q4  -22.471 -21.873 
1995q1  -22.354 -19.401 
1995q2 -25.407  -19.151 
1995q3 -27.205  -18.839 
1995q4 -30.195  -19.005 
1996q1 -32.121  -19.256 
1997q1 -31.197  -19.206 
1998q1 -29.016  -20.386 
1999q1 -25.942  -21.797 
2000q1 -28.210  -19.369   54
Table 12 
The Time-Series Determinants of Value-Weighted Average Volatility – Allowing for Break after 1994 
 
The sample has 128 observations in the period 1973q1-2005q1. The dependent variable is value-weighted volatility. All variables are defined in Table 
7. Models are collected in pairs of column: the first column reports the parameter estimate and t-statistic in the 1974-1994 period, and the second 
column is the difference between the pre-1995 and post-1994 periods. For each model we compute initially a model without accounting for lagged 
values of volatility (and compute the standard errors using Newey-West with 3 lags) and then with lagged volatility as a conditioning variable.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept  0.0193  -0.062  0.0139 -0.0409 0.0122 -0.0716 0.0079 -0.0488 0.1240  -0.4976  0.1301  -0.5176 
  (3.19) (-2.44) (3.12) (-3.17) (2.11) (-4.08) (1.08) (-3.35) (1.86)  (-2.82)  (1.08)  (-1.55) 
Lag volatility      0.242  0.3199      0.2348  0.1473      -0.0386  0.1112 
     (2.17)  (2.10)    (2.17)  (0.91)     (-0.36)  (0.65) 
Turnover  0.0094  0.0677  0.0086  0.0327       0.1169  -0.0136  0.1181  -0.0145 
  (0.68) (2.32) (1.12) (2.22)          (2.28)  (-0.25)  (5.72)  (-0.53) 
Age           -0.0058  0.0087  -0.0061  0.0102 
           ( - 2 . 0 5 )   (1.08)  (-1.28)  (0.68) 
No  dividend           0.0395  -0.0359  0.0422  -0.0461 
           ( 0 . 6 0 )   (-0.34)  (0.34)  (-0.26) 
Nasdaq           -0.3041  0.0804  -0.3095  0.1060 
           ( - 3 . 9 2 )   (0.42)  (-2.73)  (0.29) 
Maba          0.0066 0.0310 0.0079 0.0189 0.0124  0.0098  0.0122  0.0077 
          (1.94) (4.34) (1.44) (2.68) (1.88)  (1.13)  (1.66)  (0.65) 
VOLP    0.1413  -0.1603  0.1483  -0.1711 
           ( 1 . 1 0 )   (-0.48)  (0.53)  (-0.30) 
ROE           0.4140  -0.3686  0.4116  -0.3173 
           ( 1 . 4 2 )   (-0.85)  (1.89)  (-0.73) 
Not  regulated           0.0063  0.4226  0.0081  0.3978 
           ( 0 . 2 2 )   (3.08)  (0.15)  (1.79) 
Institution           -0.0015  -0.0003  -0.0015  -0.0003 
           ( - 1 . 3 1 )   (-0.23)  (-1.19)  (-0.16) 
Low  price           0.5926  -0.0727  0.6225  -0.1960 
           ( 5 . 1 5 )   (-0.37)  (3.22)  (-0.53) 
Pre-1980  Dummy           -0.0405    -0.0412   
           (-1.02)    (-0.79)   
Adj.  R-squared  0.3533 0.4856 0.4662 0.5164 0.7019 0.6973 
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